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CONFESSIONS 
The need for confessions 
The need for confessions and the need to interro-
gate suspects in the absence of counsel and without 
advising them of their right to remain silent have often 
been asserted or assumed but also sharply disputed. 
In Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), the defen-
dant argued that every police denial of a suspect's 
request to contact counsel should be viewed as a con-
stitutional violation of the right to counsel, rendering 
any resulting confession inadmissible. But a 5-4 ma-
jority of the Supreme Court dismissed this contention 
with the observation that it would have a "devastating 
effect on enforcement of criminal law, for it would 
effectively preclude police questioning-fair as well as 
unfair-until the accused was afforded opportunity to 
call his attorney" (Crooker, 441). 
A few years later, in the course of a long plurality 
opinion designed to develop a "set of principles" for 
the "voluntariness" test, Justice Felix Frankfurter 
thought it self-evident that, despite modern advances 
in crime detection technology, police interrogation 
of those suspected of involvement in an offense is 
"often indispensable to crime detection" (Culombe v. 
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961)). It followed, 
he thought, that "whatever reasonable means are 
needed to make the questioning effective must also 
be conceded to the police." Thus, "often prolonga-
tion of the interrogation period will be essential"; 
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"counsel for the suspect will generally prove a thor-
ough obstruction to the investigation"; and even in-
forming the suspect of his legal right to remain silent 
"will prove an obstruction" (Culombe, 579-580). 
The deep division in the Supreme Court in the mid-
1960s over the need to replace the traditional volun-
tariness test with new doctrines that imposed tighter 
restrictions on police interrogation may be explained 
to a considerable degree in terms of the Justices' dif-
fering views on the need for confessions. The majority 
in the famous case of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 
(1964) observed that "history amply shows that con-
fessions have often been extorted to save law enforce-
ment officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid 
and independent evidence" (490). The opinion 
strongly implied that a system which relies on "extrin-
sic evidence independently secured through skillful 
investigation" could, without seriously impairing po-
lice efficiency, replace a system "which comes to de-
pend on the 'confession.' " 
The four Justices who dissented in Escobedo also 
dissented two years later in the landmark Miranda 
opinion (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), 
and this time they made their disagreement even more 
emphatic.Justice Byron White,joined by Justices John 
Harlan and Potter Stewart, dissented, saying that the 
Miranda decision "will measurably weaken the ability 
of the criminal law to perform [its] tasks" and warning 
that in a significant number of cases "the Court's rule 
will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the 
streets [to] repeat his crime whenever it pleases him" 
(526, 541-542). Justice Thomas Clark's dissenting 
opinion expressed the fear that the Court's new "strict 
constitutional specific inserted at the nerve center of 
crime detection may well kill the patient" (500); and 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan, joined by 
Justices Stewart and White, stated that the "social 
costs of crime are too great to call the new rules any-
thing but a hazardous experimentation" (517). 
The dire predictions of the Miranda dissenters find 
little support in any of the empirical studies evaluating 
the impact of that 1966 decision on the criminal justice 
system. For example, one study concluded that the 
need for confessions was important in only a small 
number of cases and that warning a suspect of his 
right to the assistance of counsel before answering 
any questions and of his right to remain silent was 
a factor in reducing the success of interrogation in 
only about 10 percent of the cases evaluated (Project). 
Studies such as this, however, cannot be viewed 
as the last word on the need for confessions and the 
importance of police interrogation. For one thing, 
they suggest that suspects brought to the station 
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house for questioning are in such a crisis-laden situa-
tion and are so often unable to grasp the full signifi-
cance of what they are told that a system of police 
warnings is simply an inadequate means of fortifying 
a suspect's rights (Project, pp. 1572-1573, 1613). 
Moreover, the above study points out that despite 
the presence of student observers, suspects were 
given the full Miranda warnings less than one-fourth 
of the time and that when the police did give the 
warnings, they often did so in a tone and manner 
which gelded them of much of their meaning or incor-
porated some "hedging." 
It may still be argued, therefore, that careful, un-
equivocal, and emphatic Miranda warnings or a more 
effective means of implementing a suspect's rights 
than police warnings (such as requiring the presence 
of an attorney before a suspect can waive his rights) 
would have had a devastating impact on law enforce-
ment. This much, and perhaps only this much, can 
be safely said: Whatever the actual facts, "the perceived 
need [for confessions] surely has constituted the 
strongest force against attempts to abolish or restrict 
police interrogation" (Grano, 1979 b, p. 896; italics 
added). 
Historical background 
The voluntariness test and its shortcomings. Un-
til the 1940s, the rule that a confession was admissible 
if not "coerced" or "involuntary" was essentially an 
alternative statement of the rule that a confession was 
admissible if free of influences that made it untrust-
worthy or "probably untrue" (Berger, pp. 102-103). 
The "untrustworthiness" rationale-the view that the 
rules governing the admissibility of confessions were 
designed merely to protect the integrity of the fact-
finding process-was adequate to explain the exclu-
sion of the confession in the first Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process confession case, Brown v. Mississippi, 
297 U.S. 278 (1936), and in those cases that immedi-
ately followed, for they all involved threatened or 
actual police brutality or violence. But when cases 
involving the more subtle psychological pressures 
began to appear, it became more difficult to assume 
that the confessions excluded were unreliable as evi-
dence of guilt. 
The famous case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 
143 (1944) is instructive in this regard. A 6-3 majority 
reversed a murder conviction based on a confession 
obtained after thirty-six hours of almost continuous 
police interrogation. However, there was ample rea-
son to think that Ashcraft had indeed been involved 
in the murder. The man he named as his wife's killer 
promptly admitted the killing and accused Ashcraft 
of hiring him to do the job. After the interrogation, 
when examined by his family physician, Ashcraft made 
an "entirely voluntary" statement explaining why he 
wanted to kill his wife. Thus, "it is fair to suggest 
that the result reached by the [Ashcraft] Court reflected 
less a concern with the reliability of the confession 
as evidence of guilt in the particular case than disap-
proval of police methods which a majority of the Court 
conceived as generally dangerous and subject to seri-
ous abuse" (Allen, 1959, p. 235). 
In Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) and two 
companion cases, the Court overturned three convic-
tions resting on coerced confessions without disput-
ing the accuracy of Justice Robert Jackson's observa-
tion (concurring in Watts and dissenting in the other 
two cases) that the confessions in each were "inher-
ently believable" and "not shaken as to truth by any-
thing that occurred at the trial.'' The Court responded 
by pointing out that "the Due Process Clause bars 
police procedure which violates the basic notions of our 
accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime and vitiates 
a conviction based on the fruits of such procedure" 
(italics added). 
That the Court was applying two constitutional 
standards for the admissibility of confessions-a "po-
lice methods" test as well as a "trustworthiness" test-
was made even clearer by subsequent cases. Thus, 
in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), the Court 
pointed out that the refusal to permit the use of invol-
untary confessions turned not only on their untrust-
worthiness but on "the deep-rooted feeling that the 
police must obey the law while enforcing the law" 
and on the premise that "life and liberty can be as 
much endangered from illegal methods used to con-
vict those thought to be criminal as from the actual 
criminals themselves." The rejection of the untrust-
worthiness test as the exclusive rationale governing 
the admissibility of confessions was underscored in 
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). The trial 
judge had found that the police pretense of bringing 
the defendant's wife in for questioning had no ten-
dency to produce a false confession, and in his charge 
to the jury he had indicated that the admissibility of 
the confession should tum on its probable reliability. 
In reversing, the Court emphasized that the question 
whether the police tactics had produced an involun-
tary confession had to be answered "with complete 
disregard of whether or not [the defendant] in fact 
spoke the truth." 
The voluntariness test left much to be desired. It 
soon became clear that the courts were not using such 
terms as voluntariness and coercion as tools of analysis 
but as "shorthands" or conclusions. When a court 
concluded that the police had resorted to intolerable 
or sufficiently offensive interrogation tactics (the con-
clusion often turned on the "totality of circum-
stances," for example, the particular suspect's age, 
background, or other characteristics), it characterized 
the resulting confession as "involuntary" and talked 
of "overbearing" or "breaking the will." When, on 
the other hand, a court concluded that the interroga-
tion techniques were acceptable under the circum-
stances, it called the resulting confession "voluntary" 
and talked of "mental freedom" or "self-determina-
tion." Unfortunately, the courts shed insufficient light 
on the underlying analyses that led them to label a 
challenged confession "voluntary" or "involuntary" 
(Bator and Vorenberg, pp. 72-73; Kamisar, pp. 14, 
2 5, 70-76). 
Moreover, as the rationales for the Supreme Court's 
confession cases evolved, it became increasingly clear 
that terms such as voluntariness, coercion, and breaking 
the will were actually misleading. Such terms did not 
focus directly on either of the two critical concerns-
the offensiveness of the interrogation methods and 
the tendency of these methods to produce a false con-
fession (Kamisar, pp. 15-20; Paulsen, pp. 429-430; 
Schulhofer, pp. 867-878). 
Another problem with the voluntariness standard 
was that because of its vagueness and the need to 
assess the "totality of circumstances" (including such 
factors as the age, intelligence, education, racial or 
ethnic background, and previous criminal experience 
of the suspect), it furnished very little guidance to 
police officers seeking to ascertain what interrogation 
tactics they could use or to trial judges seeking to 
ascertain what criteria they should apply in resolving 
confession claims (Berger, pp. 107-112; Schulhofer, 
pp. 86g-870). 
As police interrogators made greater use of psycho-
logical techniques over the years, the always difficult 
problems of proof facing the person so questioned 
became aggravated. Frequently, the defendant was 
inarticulate and his perceptions were not acute. The 
disputed events inevitably occurred in secret, with the 
suspect isolated and often frightened or confused. 
Moreover, the local courts almost always resolved the 
virtually inevitable "swearing contest" over what hap-
pened behind closed doors in favor of the police. Per-
haps this was because any trial judge is so close to 
the scene that it is especially hard for him "to set 
apart the question of the guilt or innocence of a partic-
ular defendant and focus solely upon the procedural 
aspect of the case" (Schaefer, 1956, p. 7). 
As Geoffrey Stone has observed, "Given the [Su-
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preme] Court's inability to articulate a clear and pre-
dictable definition of voluntariness, the apparent persis-
tence of state courts in utilizing the ambiguity of the 
concept to validate confessions of doubtful constitu-
tionality, and the resultant burden on its own work-
load, it seemed inevitable that the [Supreme] Court 
would seek 'some automatic device by which the po-
tential evils of incommunicado interrogation [could] 
be controlled'" (pp. 102-103). The Supreme Court's 
dissatisfaction with the elusive voluntariness test and 
its efforts to replace the test with a more concrete 
and workable standard were to culminate in the Mir-
anda decision. 
The right-to-counsel approach. The case of Mas-
siah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) arose as fol-
lows: After Massiah had been indicted for various fed-
eral narcotic violations, had retained a lawyer and 
pleaded not guilty, and had been released on bail, 
Massiah was invited by his codefendant, Colson, to 
discuss the pending case in Colson's car. Massiah as-
sumed he was simply talking to a friend, his partner 
in crime, who had also been indicted, but unknown 
to him Colson had become a secret government agent. 
A radio transmitter had been installed under the front 
seat ofColson's car to enable a nearby agent equipped 
with a receiving device to overhear the Massiah-Col-
son conversation. As expected, Massiah made several 
damaging admissions. 
Despite the fact that Massiah was neither in custody 
nor subjected to police interrogation as these terms are 
usually understood, a 6-3 majority of the Supreme 
Court held that his damaging admissions should have 
been excluded from evidence. The decisive feature 
of the case was that after he had been indicted-"and 
therefore at a time when he was clearly entitled to a 
lawyer's help"-govemment agents had "deliberately 
elicited" statements from him in the absence of coun-
sel. Massiah stands for the proposition that once a 
person is formally charged or 'judicial" or "adver-
sary" criminal proceedings have otherwise been initi-
ated against him, his right to the assistance of counsel 
has "begun" or "attached." Unless the defendant vol-
untarily and knowingly waives that right, the absence 
of counsel under such circumstances is alone sufficient 
to exclude any resulting incriminating statements. 
Massiah was soon overshadowed by Escobedo, de-
cided a short five weeks later in the same term. When 
Escobedo was taken into custody, the police told him 
that he had been named as the one who killed his 
brother-in-law. Escobedo repeatedly but unsuccess-
fully asked to speak to his lawyer. Instead, the police 
arranged a confrontation between him and his ac-
cuser, DiGerlando. In the course of denying that he 
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had fired the fatal shots and claiming that DiGerlando 
had done so, Escobedo implicated himself in the mur-
der. 
Although Escobedo's interrogation had occurred 
before judicial or adversary proceedings had com-
menced against him, a 5-4 majority of the Court held 
that Escobedo's incriminating statements should have 
been excluded: 
The interrogation here was conducted before petitioner was 
formally indicted. But in the context of this case, that fact 
should make no difference. When petitioner requested, and 
was denied, an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the 
investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of 
'an unsolved crime.' [Citation omitted] Petitioner had be-
come the accused and the purpose of the investigation was 
to 'get him' to confess his guilt despite his constitutional 
right not to do so. At the time of his arrest, and throughout 
the course of the interrogation, the police told petitioner 
that they had convincing evidence that he had fired the 
fatal shots .... Petitioner, a layman, was undoubtedly un-
aware that ... an admission of 'mere' complicity in the 
murder plot was legally as damaging as an admission of 
firing of the fatal shots. [Citation omitted] The 'guiding 
hand of counsel' was essential to advise [him] of his rights 
in this delicate situation. . . . It would exalt form over sub-
stance to make the right to counsel, under these circum-
stances, depend on whether at the time of the interrogation, 
the authorities had secured a formal indictment [485-486]. 
Until Miranda moved the decision off center stage 
two years later, the scope and meaning of Escobedo 
was a matter of strong and widespread disagreement. 
In large part this was the result of the accordionlike 
quality of the Court's opinion. Parts of the opinion 
suggest that a suspect's right to counsel comes into 
play whenever the investigation begins to focus on 
him, regardless of whether he is in custody or has 
asked for a lawyer. At some places the opinion 
launches so broad an attack on the use of confessions 
in general and so emphatically rejects the need for 
an "effective interrogation opportunity" that it threat-
ens (or promises) to eliminate virtually all police inter-
rogation. At other places, however, the opinion is 
quite confining, so much so that it arguably limits 
the case to its special facts (Escobedo had specifically 
and repeatedly requested, and had repeatedly been 
denied, an opportunity to seek advice from counsel; 
the police had failed to warn him of his right to remain 
silent; and he was in police custody). 
The Miranda case 
The Court in Massiah and Escobedo seemed to be 
moving in the direction of banning all incriminating 
statements obtained from a suspect, even "volun-
teered" statements, unless they were made knowingly 
and with the tactical assistance of counsel. Strongly 
protesting this development, the Escobedo dissenters 
maintained that it was "incongruous to assume that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel rather than 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion governed the admissibility of confessions" (497). 
The self-incrimination provision ("No person . . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself"), they stressed, "addresses itself to 
the very issue of incriminating admissions and re-
solves it by proscribing only compelled statements" 
(497; italics added). 
A remarkable feature of the American confessions 
law is that the self-incrimination provision was long 
deemed inapplicable to police interrogation. It was 
not until 1964 that the Supreme Court even held that 
Fourteenth Amendment due process "secures against 
state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amend-
ment guarantees against federal infringement-the 
right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses 
to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, 
and to suffer no penalty [for] such silence" (Malloy 
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); italics added). But 
until Miranda the privilege against self-incrimination 
had not been deemed applicable in federal confession 
cases either--certainly not as it applied to judicial or 
other formal proceedings. 
Why had the self-incrimination provision been ex-
cluded from the police station and other kinds of"cus-
todial interrogation" until Miranda? The legal reason-
ing was that "compulsion" to testify against oneself 
meant l,egal compulsion. Thus, a legislative committee 
could not hold a witness in contempt for refusing 
to incriminate himself. Nor could a court hold a defen-
dant in contempt for refusing to testify at his own 
trial. But a person subjected to police interrogation 
cannot l,egally be compelled to say anything, since he 
is threatened neither with perjury for testifying falsely 
nor with contempt for refusing to testify at all. Thus 
it could not be said, ran the pre-Miranda argument, 
that the interrogated suspect was being "compelled" 
to be a witness against himself within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment-even though he was likely 
to assume or be led by the police to believe that there 
were legal ( or extralegal) sanctions for refusing to 
"cooperate" (Kamisar, pp. 45-46; Schaefer, 1967, pp. 
16-18; Traynor, p. 674). 
In Miranda a 5-4 majority, speaking through Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, concluded at long last that "all 
the principles embodied in the privilege [against self-
incrimination] apply to informal compulsion exerted 
by law-enforcement officers during in-custody ques-
tioning" (461). Observed the Court: 
An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police 
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected 
to the [tactics described in various police interrogation man-
uals, from which the Court quoted at length] cannot be 
otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical 
matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of 
the police station may well be greater than in courts or 
other official investigations, where there are often impartial 
observers to guard against intimidation or trickery [461]. 
[The "interrogation environment"] carries its own badge 
of intimidation [and] is at odds with [the privilege against 
self-incrimination]. Unless adequate protective devices are 
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant 
can truly be the product of his free choice [457-458]. 
The "adequate protective" devices necessary to 
"neutralize" the "interrogation environment"-the 
coercive conditions surrounding or inherent in "cus-
todial police interrogation"-are, of course, the now 
familiar "Miranda warnings." Miranda's confession 
would have plainly been admissible a few years earlier, 
for he had confessed to a rape-kidnapping after only 
two hours of questioning. But what proved fatal for 
the government was that neither before nor during 
the questioning had the police advised him of his right 
to remain silent, his right to consult with an attorney 
(either retained or, if the defendant is indigent, as 
Miranda was, appointed) before answering questions, 
or his right to have an attorney present during the 
interrogation. 
Although Miranda is grounded primarily on the 
privilege against self-incrimination, it also has a right-
to-counsel component designed to protect and to re-
inforce the privilege. After he has been taken into cus-
tody "or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way" and prior to any questioning, 
a suspect must be warned that he has a right to remain 
silent and to be advised that "anything said can and 
will be used against [him] in court" (469). But such 
a warning (and explanation) "cannot itself suffice" 
to "assure that the individual's right to choose be-
tween silence and speech remains unfettered through-
out the interrogation process" (469). Thus, the sus-
pect must also be told of his right to counsel, either 
retained or appointed. "The need for counsel to pro-
tect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not 
merely a right to consult with counsel prior to any 
questioning, but also to have counsel present during 
any questioning if the defendant so desires" (470). 
A suspect, of course, may waive his rights, provided 
he does so "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" 
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(444). But no valid waiver can be recognized "unless 
specifically made after the warnings [have] been 
given" (470). Moreover, the "mere fact that [a person] 
may have answered some questions or volunteered 
some statements on his own does not deprive him 
of the right to refrain from answering any further 
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and 
thereafter consents to be questioned" (445). 
Miranda was the "high-water mark" of the Warren 
Court's "due process revolution" (Graham, 1970, p. 
157). It plunged "the Warren Court into an ocean 
of abuse" and became "one of the leading issues of 
the 1968 presidential campaign" (Lieberman, p. 326). 
Nevertheless, the case may fairly be viewed as a com-
promise between the old voluntariness test (and the 
coercive interrogation tactics which that elusive test 
permitted in fact) and extreme proposals (based on 
an expansive reading of Massiah and Escobedo) that, 
as was feared (or hoped) on the eve of Miranda, would 
have "killed" confessions. 
Miranda did not, and was not designed to, "kill" 
confessions. It allows the police to conduct "general 
on-the-scene questioning" or "other general ques-
tioning of citizens" (4 77-4 78) even though the citizen 
is neither informed nor aware of his rights. Moreover, 
according to Miranda, so long as the police do not 
question the suspect, they are free to hear and act 
upon volunteered statements even though the suspect 
has been brought to the police station or otherwise 
taken into custody. Custody does not in itself call for 
the Miranda warnings. It is only the combination of cus-
tody and interrogation that establishes the interroga-
tion environment which is so at odds with the privilege 
against self-incrimination and which calls for Miran-
da's protective devices (Kamisar, pp. 195-197). 
On the eve of Miranda, fear was voiced that the 
Supreme Court might "project" counsel into the po-
lice station, and doubts were raised whether it would 
still be "possible to enforce criminal law" if that were 
to occur (Kamisar et al., p. 523; cf. pp. 498-514). 
But Miranda did not fully project counsel into the sta-
tion house, for it did not require that a suspect actually 
consult with a lawyer in order for his waiver of consti-
tutional rights to be valid. 
Whether suspects are continuing to confess because 
they do not fully grasp the meaning of the Miranda 
warnings, because the promptings of conscience over-
ride the impact of the warnings, or because the police 
are hedging or undermining the warnings, it is plain 
that they are continuing to confess with great fre-
quency (Stephens, pp. 165-200; Project; Medalie, 
Zeitz, and Alexander). It is difficult to believe that 
this would have been the case if Miranda had fully 
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projected counsel into the interrogation room by re-
quiring the advice of counsel or the presence of coun-
sel before a suspect could effectively waive counsel 
and his right to remain silent. 
Because Miranda was the centerpiece of the Warren 
Court's "revolution in American criminal procedure" 
and the prime target "of those who attributed the 
mounting wave of crime to the softness of judges" 
(Lieberman, p. 326), almost everyone expected the 
Burger Court to treat Miranda unkindly. And it did, 
for a decade. Thus, the new Court held that state-
ments obtained by police who issued defective warn-
ings or who refused to honor a suspect's assertion 
of his rights and continued to question him, although 
inadmissible in the presentation of the prosecution's 
own case, could be used to impeach the defendant's 
credibility if he took the stand (Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 
(1975); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), in 
which a second interrogation session that occurred 
after a suspect initially refused to make a statement 
did not violate Miranda under the circumstances of 
the case; Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), 
in which it was held that not all police questioning 
that takes place in a station house is necessarily "cus-
todial interrogation"). 
However, in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 
(1980), the Court gave interrogation within the meaning 
of Miranda a fairly generous interpretation, holding 
that the Miranda safeguards come into force "when-
ever a person in custody is subjected to either express 
questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to 
say, the term 'interrogation' refers not only to express 
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the 
part of the police (other than those normally attendant 
to arrest and custody) that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse from the suspect" (300-301). 
One may quarrel with the Court's application of its 
definition of interrogation to the Innis facts, as the three 
dissenters did. The majority held that Innis had not 
been interrogated when, after he had been arrested 
and put in a squad car, two police officers conversing 
with each other in the front of the car, but in Innis's 
presence, expressed concern that because the murder 
had occurred in the vicinity of a school for handi-
capped children, one of the children might find the 
missing shotgun and injure himself. At this point, In-
nis interrupted the officers and offered to lead them 
to where the shotgun was hidden. But Innis is a harder 
case than most because there was "a basis for conclud-
ing that the officer's remarks were made for some 
purpose other than that of obtaining evidence from 
the suspect. An objective listener could plausibly con-
clude that the policemen's remarks in Innis were made 
solely to express their genuine concern about the dan-
ger posed by the hidden shotgun." The suspect might 
have viewed the purpose of the police conversation 
in the front of the car the same way, and if he did, 
"he would differentiate the speech or conduct from 
a 'direct question' because he would not see it as a 
demand for information" (White, 1980, pp. 1234-
1235). 
Considering the various alternatives, the Innis case's 
definition of interrogation seems more significant than 
the Court's questionable application ofit in that case. 
The Court might have adopted a mechanical ap-
proach, as some lower courts had, and limited interro-
gation to those situations in which the police directly 
address a suspect. It might have limited interrogation 
to those instances in which the record establishes that 
the police intended to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse, a rule that would have been very difficult to 
administer. But the Court did not adopt either of these 
approaches. Moreover, by explicitly including police 
tactics that do not involve verbal conduct, the Court 
appears to have repudiated the position taken by a 
number of lower courts that confronting a suspect 
with incriminating physical evidence or with an ac-
complice who has confessed and is seeking to put 
most of the blame on his cosuspect is not interroga-
tion because it involves no verbal conduct on the part 
of the police (White, 1980, p. 1234). 
Despite the fairly generous reading of Miranda in 
the Innis case, by holding the defendant's incriminat-
ing disclosures admissible the Court maintained its 
record of not excluding a single item of evidence 
solely on Miranda grounds since Warren Burger be-
came Chief Justice in June of 1969. But that eleven-
year record was broken the following year. Without 
a dissent, the Court excluded incriminating state-
ments on the authority of Miranda in two 1981 cases 
decided the same day: Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477 (1981) and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) 
(alternative holding). 
In Edwards, the suspect asserted his right to counsel, 
but the police, without furnishing him a lawyer, re-
turned the next day and reinterrogated him. The 
Court held that once a suspect requests a lawyer, he 
cannot be subjected to further interrogation until 
counsel has been made available to him "unless the 
[suspect] himself initiates further communication, ex-
changes or conversation with the police" (Edwards, 
485). In Smith, the Court held that the death sentence 
imposed on the defendant was fatally tainted by the 
use, during the penalty phase of his trial, of a court-
appointed psychiatrist's pretrial evaluation of the de-
fendant's future dangerousness. The admission of the 
psychiatrist's testimony, ruled the Court, violated the 
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, be-
cause he was not advised before the psychiatric exami-
nation that he had a right to remain silent and that 
any statement he made could be used against him 
at a capital sentencing proceeding. 
The demise of Escobedo and the revivification 
of Massiah 
Although the Miranda Court understandably tried 
to retain some continuity with the Escobedo opinion, 
it has become increasingly clear that Miranda actually 
marked a fresh start in describing the circumstances 
under which Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections 
come into play. Escobedo seemed to assign great signifi-
cance to the amount of evidence available to the police 
at the time of questioning; the opinion therefore con-
tains much talk about "prime suspects," "focal point," 
and the "accusatory stage." But Miranda attaches pri-
mary significance to the conditions surrounding, or inherent 
in, the interrogation setting; thus, the opinion in-
cludes much discussion of the "interrogation environ-
ment" and the "police-dominated" atmosphere. If an 
individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, Mi-
randa applies whether or not the individual is a prime 
suspect or the focal point of the investigation. On 
the other hand, if a person is not subjected to custo-
dial interrogation and the pressures generated 
thereby, despite the implications of Escobedo he is not 
entitled to be advised of his rights no matter how 
intensely the police have focused on him or to what 
extent they regard him as the prime suspect. In short, 
Miranda did not enlarge Escobedo as much as it dis-
placed it (Kamisar, pp. 162-163). 
The same cannot be said for Massiah. Although Mi-
randa has dominated the confessions scene since the 
mid- l 960s, Massiah has emerged as the other major 
Warren Court confessions doctrine. As clarified and 
strengthened by two Burger Court decisions, Brewer 
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and United States v. 
Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), Massiah holds that once 
adversary or judicial proceedings have commenced 
against an individual (by way of indictment, informa-
tion, or "initial appearance" before a magistrate), gov-
ernment efforts to "deliberately elicit" incriminating 
statements from him, whether done openly by uni-
formed police officers (as in Williams) or surrepti-
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tiously by "secret agents" (as in Massiah and Henry), 
violate the individual's right to counsel. The Massiah 
doctrine represents a "pure" or "straight" right-to-
counsel approach. It comes into play regardless of 
whether a person is in custody or being subjected 
to interrogation in the Miranda sense. There need 
not be any "compelling influences," inherent, infor-
mal, or otherwise. In the Massiah case itself, of course, 
the defendant was free on bail and unaware that he 
was talking to a government agent. He thought he 
was merely chatting with a codefendant. 
Massiah operates on the premise that "by its history, 
language, and function, the [Sixth Amendment] 
sought to draw a starting point after which counsel's 
assistance is generally required as an element of 
our adversary system" (Israel, p. 1368, n. 224). This 
starting point is reached when judicial or adversary 
criminal proceedings are initiated. At this point the 
criminal investigation has ended and the criminal 
prosecution, to which the pure right to counsel is 
applicable, has begun. The adverse positions of the 
government and the defendant have solidified. The 
parties, as the Court put it in the Henry case, are then 
" 'arms length' adversaries" (273). At this point, it 
seems, the government has built its case. But if it 
has not, it may no longer elicit any information from 
the defendant himself. It may only proceed against 
him through his counsel. 
The Burger Court decisions in Williams and Henry 
revitalized Massiah; one might even say they "disin-
terred" it {Grano, 1979a, p. 7). For until these deci-
sions, there was good reason to think that Massiah 
had only been a stepping-stone to Escobedo and that 
it had been lost in the shuffle of fast-moving events 
that reshaped constitutional criminal procedure in the 
1960s (Kamisar, pp. xvi, 160-164). 
Actually, the Henry case not only reaffirmed the Mas-
siah doctrine but expanded it, for it applied Massiah 
to a situation in which the Federal Bureau oflilvestiga-
tion had instructed its secret agent, ostensibly a fellow 
prisoner, not to question the defendant about the 
crime, and there was no showing that he had. But it 
sufficed that the FBI had "intentionally create[ d] a 
situation likely to induce [the defendant] to make in-
criminating statements without the assistance of coun-
sel" (Henry, 274). The government created such a situ-
ation, ruled the Henry Court, when an FBI agent 
instructed the undercover informant to be alert to 
any statements made by the defendant, who was 
housed in the same cellblock. "Even if the FBI agent's 
statement is accepted that he did not intend that [the 
defendant's] 'fellow inmate' would take affirmative 
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steps to secure incriminating information, [he] must 
have known that such propinquity likely would lead 
to that result" (271). 
Some final thoughts 
Although few, if any, would have predicted it in 
the mid- l 970s, in the second decade of the Burger 
Court, Miranda was not only very much alive but in 
some respects reinvigorated. Moreover, the Massiah 
doctrine had emerged as a much more potent force 
than it ever had been in the Warren Court era. Al-
though at various times in the 1970s several members 
of the Burger Court seemed to be casting a longing 
eye at the old "voluntariness" test, the Court's action 
in Edwards and Smith, its generous reading of Miranda 
in the Innis case, and its even more generous reading 
of Massiah in the Henry case have, to borrow the lan-
guage of one commentator, "reaffirmed its commit-
ment to controlling police efforts to induce confes-
sions by constitutional rules that look beyond the 
voluntariness test" (White, 1979 b, p. 69). 
Whatever chipping away or retreats from Miranda 
and Massiah are achieved by the Supreme Court, "one 
can be sure that the status quo ante will not be re-
stored. By reason of what the Warren Court said and 
did, we now perceive as problems what too often were 
not seen as problems before. This is the dynamic of 
change, and that fact may well be more significant 
than many of the solutions proposed by the Warren 
Court" (Allen, 1975, p. 539). 
YALE KAMISAR 
See also COUNSEL: RIGHT TO COUNSEL; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS; EXCLUSIONARY RULES. 
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